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Kant's text even illustrates hypotyposis by hypotyposis: His verbal comparison between the comparison between tyrannies and pepper grinders, on one hand, and symbolic and schematic hypotyposes, on the other, shows by symbolic hypotyposis how symbols and schemata are both hypotyposes. The proof concerning demonstration is not demonstrated directly: discourse and method occur together, method being talked about in discourse. In this place, repeatedly, the philosophy of language takes a leap of faith, and claims to plug into natural science: it bids to become a natural science of language, grounded in necessity, as in Descartes, Russell, early Wittgenstein, or Chomsky.
This is the place where philosophers start saying, with regard to analogy, that it really seems.
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One's degree of faith in the reality of analogy is not so much an interpretation as a decision. Hypotyposis, or any construct that serves its placeholding function, is a black box. For de Man, I would suggest, such a construct is not a solution but a "difficulty of rendering. We can only agree with Kant that if it is somewhere, there is where it should go. Now, Derrida argues in "Typewriter Ribbon" that "materiality" is, like hypotyposis, a word to put down when one can go no further.
In "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," de Man casts his characterization of Kant's description of the ocean as a catachretic act of nomination: "the only word that comes to mind is that of a material vision" AI In "Kant and Schiller" de Man again struggles to nominate "something [properly unnameable—RT] which one could call a progression—though it shouldn't be—a movement, from cognition, from acts of knowledge, from states of cognition, to something [again—RT] which is no longer a cognition but which is to some extent an occurrence , which has the materiality of something that actually happens" AI Noting de Man's appeals "to what he himself says he calls text'" TR and " what is called materialism'" AI , quoted in TR , Derrida proposes that "materiality" for de Man is whatever fills "the place of prosaic resistance" TR , "a very useful generic name for all that resists appropriation" TR , or, going even further, "the name, the artifactual nomination of an artifactual figure.
In this case the materiality of language is de Man's X at the spot where aesthetics cannot be completed. Various philosophical choices may then be made. The resort to algebra—"here is where something should go"—leads to a literature in which indexicals and names are the foundations of knowledge: a new metaphysics, potentially, or a deconstructive nominalism. Cohen, Cohen, and Miller continue to treat materiality as part of a realm "out of which experience is projected.
De Man's conclusion at the end of "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant" is that the loss of "the architectonic unity of the system. A forward-thinking literary theory, I would suggest, would not read in this conclusion the possibility of something like a transcendental philosophy persisting but no longer being predictable or unified, 18 or persisting in ruins whose debris could be taken up and used for other purposes, or turned against itself, not least because one cannot turn against itself a machinery whose very existence is dubious. Rather, because Kant leaves a question mark at the most important place in his system, the transcendental philosophy will not have been something so substantial as to have produced debris.
It will have been a plan for a system that never got finished. One can keep trying to revise and finish it, but that makes sense only if you wish it worked. If you are relieved that it doesn't work, the issue is still open, but for the moment, it makes more sense to say: So much for that. That way lies a renewed empiricism, not eighteenth-century empiricism, but a radical empiricism strong enough to encompass formalism. The desire of this position lies in its ambition to reach into the structures that produce history and the sensorium, thereby arriving at a means of generating histories and sensoria, potentially for all.
Changing the past is a crucial revolutionary desire for which Benjamin is a very good keynote. I do not mean to derogate it in the slightest by suggesting that it has been given most serious expression in the mode of impossibility. Rendered possible , it is no longer the same desire, no longer revolutionary but totalitarian. The idea of possibly intervening in regimes of definition and perception is downright frightening it also opens up the black comic possibility of a Charlie Kaufmanesque nightmare of botched interventions , and with good reason "remains unengaged in de Man's text.
In his thoroughly brilliant book Ends of the Lyric, Timothy Bahti draws a distinction between "seeing" and "reading" using the example of Shakespeare's Sonnet Bahti notes that the poem's chiasmi of repeating words can be noticed even by a reader who doesn't know English, as in line 4: "darkly bright. Others depend on semantics, like line 1's "most I. We could say that the chiasmus can be filled in with intuitive or symbolic content—literal or figurative seeing—while the chiasmic form channels us toward understanding "seeing" in a metaphoric sense , that "dark, bright, bright, dark," is like "most, I, eyes, best.
He continues, "reading would appear' [at the end of the poem] if it were something one could see, but instead one can only read the vanishing of sight" Described as though it were given, the perceptual process of seeing is made to provide ballast for reading-in-abstraction-from-seeing, an "end" of lyric in a reading remaining to be seen.
There is a double sense of "reading" here: as participle, reading is what we do as we see and interpret; as abstract noun, it is the never wholly attained end product of seeing, interpreting, and learning not to see. The assumption is that texts and reading, like tyrannies, are not phenomenal entities and processes, while pages and retinal activities, like pepper grinders, are.
We are so used to thinking metaphysically, whether in deconstructive or in humanistic subgroups—especially those of us who work on lyric—that it is hard to imagine any other way of approaching seeing and reading. But what if texts and tyrannies and retinal activities were on the same level—were alike empirical entities, not aesthetic ones, only subject to more or less complex inspection?
If there were, it would become evident that inspection itself is a difficulty all the way down or up. Daniel Dennett, in a typically brisk fifteen-page treatment of a vast question, in this case an essay called "Seeing is Believing—or Is It?
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What Dennett poses as "the nature of takings'" is none other than the question of seeing and reading—the question of whether and when "a state of the nervous system" is to count as a "perception" , How do we know we've seen something? We remember it, so we believe we've had a perception; or we took a photo, and believe that the photo is a picture of what we perceived.
Not always: Scarry, stressing mental images, thinks of ordinary perceptual states as richer than what Dennett calls belief states memories, conjurings , but thinks of literary belief states as being as rich as ordinary perceptual states. Bahti, stressing texts, understandably thinks of interpretations, belief states, as richer than the perceptual states of seeing letters. For my argument, though, it doesn't matter which way the values go. What matters is the dualism and its tendency to obscure "what happens in the middle," which in Dennett's opinion is everything.
Both ways of talking are reckoned as metaphors" , he remarks. In the end, Dennett argues, "the idea that we can identify perceptual —as opposed to conceptual—states by an evaluation of their contents turns out to be an illusion" In illustrating this point, Dennett calls upon the classical celebration of hypotyposis as a presentation modeled on vision: "After all"—he channels an interlocutor—"perceptions are like pictures, beliefs are like sentences, and a picture's worth a thousand words.
But," he goes on, "these are spurious connotations. There is no upper bound on the richness of content of a proposition " The allusion to the rhetorical tradition is not casual: much of Dennett's discussion constitutes a commentary on metaphoric transfer from the perspective of empirical studies of perception. For the eliminativist Dennett, who believes that only technological obstacles prevent consciousness from being analyzed into directly or indirectly observable material elements, analogies between perception and cognition are not effectively ideological.
Rather, it is the concept "cognition" that makes it sound as though there were supernatural substances or forces immune in principle to even the most powerful and indirect observation. For Dennett cognitions are in principle observable, while under the current scientific understanding, perception is scarcely less enigmatic than cognition. A cognition is like a perception not because it's as plain as day but because it's as clear as mud.
Thus it is neither illuminating nor mystifying to compare cognition to perception. Because there is no nonmetaphorical way of talking about what even a perception is, seeing —in the ambiguous, sense-conflating sense—after all better represents the state of knowledge regarding perception and cognition than a distinction between "perception" and "cognition" which can be made logically but cannot be grounded in any difference in content. Perceptions are like pictures, beliefs are like sentences—and perceptions are like sentences, and beliefs are like pictures.
Until we know more, a thousand words on the topic are not yet worth a dime. As a deconstructive materialist writing in the wake of Paul de Man, I would rather tell you that than "burden the system with extra machinery," as Dennett puts it, "—scene-painting machinery or script-writing machinery" Either kind of machinery resubscribes to systems of mind that understate the complexity, not only of reading, but of the very idea of sensory perception, which nonetheless remains the only channel epistemology gets.
Amiran, Eyal. Bahti, Timothy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, Brodsky, Claudia. Durham: Duke UP, Burt, E. Stanford: Stanford UP, Butler, Judith. London: Verso, Caruth, Cathy and Deborah Esch, eds. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, Chase, Cynthia. Clark, David L. Douglas Kneale. Cohen, Tom.
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Anti-Mimesis from Plato to Hitchcock. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, Cohen, Tom, Barbara Cohen, and J. Hillis Miller. Tom Cohen, Barbara Cohen, J. Hillis Miller, and Andrzej Warminski. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, De Graef, Ortwin. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, Andrzej Warminski. Minneaplois: U of Minnesota P, Critical Writings Lindsay Waters. Dennett, Daniel.
Robert Schwartz. London: Blackwell, Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression.
Engaging through Seeing: A Reading of Bewick and Brontë’s Imaginative Illustrations
Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: U of Chicago P, Ferguson, Frances. Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation. New York: Routledge, Stanford UP, Wlad Godzich and Lindsay Waters. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Werner S. Indianapolis: Hackett, Lovejoy, Arthur. Scarry, Elaine. Terada, Rei. Michael Temple. Exeter: U of Exeter P, Warminski, Andrzej. Henceforward AI. Maybe one could say that the "necessary degradation of melody into harmony. Henceforward RT. Hillis Miller, "A Materiality without Matter?
Many arguments of "A Materiality without Matter? What I argue here is true of Cohen's books as well. It is the collective enterprise of the Material Events conference and volume, however, that more explicitly shapes the scholarly conversation about de Man. Burt deals with a similar problem, de Man's emphasis on the one-way arrow of the time of inscription, by identifying that time with a revolutionary drive toward the future, i. For other thoughts on the irreversibility of inscription see Jacques Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink 2 'within such limits' ", in Material Events , p.
The handmill is a Riffaterrean object, a generic object that does not contribute anything beyond its illustrative function, yet can function even though we don't know what is doing the illustrating, because we understand enough of the terms in the mutually implicated network of references of which it is part. The handmill, like any other single term, can be an example whose content is bracketed: there is nothing in this handmill.
But it can also mean: the regulatory and constitutive conditions of the appearance of any given object. The latter sense is the one in which the condition is not external to the object it occasions, but is its constitutive condition and the principle of its development and appearance" "Competing Universalities," in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left [London: Verso, ], p.
Inscription for CCM is transcendental in the second sense; as Butler notes, such a transcendental condition can be "considered to have a historicity—that is. Like post-Lacanian political philosophy, CCM's use of inscription, and perhaps also Derrida's in "Typewriter Ribbon," uses the second model of transcendental condition to fold historical contingency into a priori form and power.
But since such a folding is the goal of Kantian aesthetics in the first place, and non transcendental ways of conceiving the relation between contingency and form are available, second-tier transcendentalism often looks as though it were motivated by the desire to preserve first-tier transcendentalism.
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If they ['the nonphenomenal material and formal properties' of language] are empirical qualities, pragmatic properties, they will never be able to elevate themselves to the thought of difference. If they are universal and general properties, then they are properties that make the difference, and all that has been achieved is a, perhaps, more sophisticated philosophical questioning of philosophical difference" "In-Difference" But there are of course answers from radical empiricism that from its perhaps incommeasurable perspective deal with these complaints.
For a recent version see Bas C. How do we use it? How do we receive the information it transmits between its makers and receivers? Chanccani Quipu reminds readers that there have been, and still are, many forms of writing in this hemisphere other than the alphabetic systems imported and imposed by European colonizers.
T he indigenous people of the Andes region used the quipu — a complex, multidimensional system of twisted and knotted cords — to record key information about their societies. It is a prayer for the rebirth of a way of writing with breath, a way of perceiving the body and the cosmos as a whole engaged in a continuous reciprocal exchange.
Too Much Bliss. New York: Granary Books, Binding by Daniel E. Kelm and staff at The Wide Awake Garage. Clamshell box by Jill Jevne. Edition of In this non-narrative book, the sight, feel, and smell of each sheet constitutes a compelling story. Waldman, Anne, and George Schneeman. Homage to Allen G. Printed by Phillip Gallo. Boxes by Barbara Mauriello and Judith Ivry. Rothenberg, Jerome, and David M.